Peripheralisation: the missing link in dealing with demographic change? by Leibert, Tim & Golinski, Sophie
www.ssoar.info
Peripheralisation: the missing link in dealing with
demographic change?
Leibert, Tim; Golinski, Sophie
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Leibert, T., & Golinski, S. (2016). Peripheralisation: the missing link in dealing with demographic change? Comparative
Population Studies - Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft, 41(3-4), 1-30. https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2017-02en
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-SA Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-SA Licence
(Attribution-ShareAlike). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bib-cpos-2017-02en7
Peripheralisation: The Missing Link in Dealing with Demographic 
Change?
Tim Leibert, Sophie Golinski
Abstract: Demographic change is an uneven spatial process in Germany. Depopu-
lation and ageing have become pressing issues in most rural regions. In connection 
with low population densities and the fi nancial diffi culties of municipalities and ser-
vice providers in rural regions, these demographic trends have led to a discussion 
about the future provision of services of general interest and – more broadly – the 
postulate of equal living conditions which was for a long time the basic principle of 
spatial development in Germany. In this paper, we argue that the peripheralisation 
approach is a helpful tool to better understand how interaction of out-migration, 
dependence, disconnection and stigmatisation shape the future of rural regions. We 
also discuss the impact of peripheralisation on the development and implementa-
tion of adaptation strategies. Based on the 3R-model (retrenchment, repositioning, 
reorganisation), we argue that adaptation strategies can reinforce (retrenchment) 
peripheralisation processes, but also serve as groundwork for the formulation of 
policies aiming at de-peripheralisation.
Keywords: Peripheralisation · Demographic change · Adaptation strategies · Public 
services · East Germany
1 Introduction: The demographisation of the debate on the future of 
rural areas
Territorial inequalities are increasing in all parts of the developed world. The reasons 
underpinning the growing rift between prospering cores and declining peripheries 
are essentially the same. America’s “rural ghettoes”, the “désert français” and de-
caying villages of East Germany are all similarly affected by remoteness, structural 
economic weaknesses, long-term unemployment, out-migration and ageing (Neu 
2006). The depopulation of already sparsely populated regions combined with the 
budgetary crisis affecting public authorities has resulted in a controversial debate 
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about the future provision of services of general interest as well as of social and 
technical infrastructures in the countryside. A striking feature of this debate is the 
lack of consideration for rural populations – aside from calls for more civic participa-
tion. Demography, on the other hand, is omnipresent, be it in terms of infrastructure 
costs per capita, minimum populations, carrying capacities and the size of catch-
ment areas. The demographisation of the debate on the future of rural areas can be 
summed up in one sentence: demography becomes destiny. It is assumed that the 
structure of the population determines the future prospects of any given society 
or region (Neu 2009: 83). Social, economic and cultural drivers are factored out or 
interpreted as a mere consequence of demographic changes (Beetz 2013: 55). 
The demographisation of social phenomena is a highly persuasive mechanism. 
Demographic trends are increasingly treated as inherent necessities and used to le-
gitimise reform proposals (Berger/Kahlert 2006: 10). They are also utilised as argu-
ments against political agendas that have become integral parts of the self-concep-
tion of the Federal Republic of Germany, such as the paradigm of balanced spatial 
development and the idea of equitable living conditions in all parts of the country 
(Neu 2009: 84; Canzler/Knie 2009: 97). These formerly unquestioned political goals 
are increasingly being perceived as obstacles in the process of making rural re-
gions “fi t for the future” (see e.g., Klingholz 2015; Canzler/Knie 2009: 106-107). There 
seems to be an emerging societal consensus on the fact that the constitutional man-
date guaranteeing equitable living conditions in sparsely populated rural regions is 
no longer applicable (Barlösius/Neu 2007: 79). Instead of “thinking outside the box” 
and developing innovative solutions that go beyond short-term pilot projects, the 
future of infrastructures and public services in rural regions is discussed in terms of 
minimum standards, subsidy requirements, and cost recovery. Reinterpreting the 
future of rural regions as an inevitable “demographic destiny” implies excluding this 
question from the political decision-making process, nipping in the bud discussions 
regarding the organisation of territorial and social cohesion in Germany (Barlösius/
Neu 2007: 88). This reinterpretation also eludes how approval procedures, adminis-
trative processes, allocation of tasks between the state, the market and the citizens 
as well as competences and funding of local governments could be adapted in order 
to allow for the implementation of more innovative solutions. 
This paper has two main aims. The fi rst one is to add an additional perspective to 
current research on the causes and consequences of demographic change as well 
as on possible adaptation strategies. Following Lang (2012: 1749), we argue that the 
causes and consequences of shrinkage and ageing can be better understood by 
using the concept of peripheralisation: namely since uneven spatial developments 
are linked to societal processes as well as to supraregional and even supranational 
developments. Our second aim is to bring rural people (back) into the focus of re-
search on rural restructuring. It has been argued that the response of people living 
in sparsely inhabited and depopulating rural regions to service cuts and the dis-
mantling of services of general interest and of technical and social infrastructures is 
hardly taken into account (Hyll/Schneider 2011: 217-218). This is due to the fact that 
the adaptation of services and infrastructures to a decreasing population is in the 
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fi rst place perceived as a technical problem of quantities, not as a social problem of 
participation and exclusion. 
This paper is structured as follows. The second section centres on regional pe-
ripheralisation and addresses the four sub-dimensions of this concept, namely out-
migration (section 2.1), disconnection (section 2.2), dependence (section 2.3), and 
stigmatisation (section 2.4). In a short case study (section 2.5), we consider the Land 
of Saxony-Anhalt to empirically illustrate peripheralisation processes and their spa-
tial effects under conditions of demographic change. Section three deals with the 
infl uence of peripheralisation on the adaptation of public services. We discusses 
the 3R-model (retrenchment, reorganisation, repositioning) as an analytic concept 
of possible adaptation strategies in the triangle of confl icting priorities between 
tight budgets, demographic change and the principle of equivalent living conditions 
enshrined in the German Constitution. In section 4, we sum up the most important 
fi ndings and shed light on future research issues. 
2 Theorising peripheralisation: The interplay of out-migration, 
disconnection, dependence and stigmatisation
Peripheralisation is the process of producing and reproducing peripheries through 
mechanisms of out-migration, disconnection, dependence, and stigmatisation 
(Kühn/Weck 2013: 24), which lead to the “gradual weakening and/or uncoupling of 
the socio-spatial development in a given region vis-à-vis the dominant process of 
centralisation”1 (Keim 2006: 3). Peripheralisation is driven by the action of certain 
actors, which, in turn, means that peripheries are not only determined by geograph-
ical location or the quality of the transport infrastructure (Kühn/Weck 2013: 24), but 
also by purposive decisions and their – often unintended – side effects. There are, 
hence, no distinct indicators or thresholds that can be used to transform peripher-
alisation into a statistically tangible and mappable concept (Lang 2012: 1751). Both 
Kühn/Bernt (2013: 312) and Lang (2012: 1751) stress the relational nature of periph-
eralisation. The former argue that peripheralisation is a process consisting in down-
grading a specifi c region vis-à-vis other regions, while the latter underscores the 
role of normative interpretations by pointing out that centre and periphery emerge 
in overall societal discourses. 
Peripheralisation is, consequently, not an independent process, but a logical con-
sequence of centralisation. As the two sides of the same coin, both processes “form 
a complementary as well as contradictory dialectic unit” (Kühn/Bernt 2013: 303). 
Centralisation and peripheralisation are characterised by antithetic socio-spatial 
processes: autonomy/dependency; inclusion/exclusion; hegemony/stigmatisation; 
growth/decline; in-migration/out-migration (Kühn 2015: 375). Centralisation hence 
leads to the concentration of people, economic power, and infrastructure in metro-
politan areas at the expense of other, mostly rural, regions. The main consequence 
of peripheralisation is a process of cultural, demographic, economic, and social con-
1 Direct quotes from German texts have been translated by the authors.
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traction, which leads to an increasing specialisation of a once multifunctional region 
to a restricted number of uses and activities (Keim 2006). Taken together, peripher-
alisation results in a permanent consolidation of structural defi cits and restrains op-
portunities for the resident population (Beetz 2008). These structural defi cits are not 
necessarily economic in nature, as peripheralisation is a multi-dimensional and mul-
tifaceted process that also includes demographic, social, infrastructural, cultural, 
and political aspects (Kühn 2015). Fischer-Tahir/Naumann (2013: 18) add a different 
angle to this reasoning by linking peripheralisation and marginalisation in order to 
point out that “peripheralisation refers to a spatially organised inequality of power 
relations and access to material and symbolic goods that constructs and perpetu-
ates the precedence of the centres over areas that are marginalised”.
Yet, there is not even a consensus whether peripheralisation is still a predomi-
nantly spatial process. Copus (2001: 539) argues that – due to changes in the eco-
nomic environment “in future peripherality will increasingly become an aspatial 
issue”. The relevant economic and technical developments are improvements in 
the transport and communication infrastructure, structural changes in the industry 
structure, in particular the expansion of the service sector at the expense of agricul-
ture and heavy industries, and the advent and dynamic development of the infor-
mation society, including the increasing importance of e-commerce (Copus 2001: 
544). These changes have – at least in theory – lead to a decreasing importance of 
distance, travel time and transportation costs. “Aspatial peripherality” is hence not 
characterised by geographical location, but by the lack of embeddedness in busi-
ness and institutional networks, poor access to and/or availability of social capital 
and information and communication infrastructures as well as weak links to global 
markets and information networks (Copus 2001: 544-546). Other authors, e.g. Ba-
logh (2015), Lang (2015) or Paasi (1995) view peripheries and peripherality as so-
cially constructed. Peripheralisation as the act of (re)producing peripheries is hence 
the result of socio-material and discursive processes (Balogh 2015).
The conceptualisation of peripheralisation goes beyond the “taken for granted” 
(Paasi 1995: 235) understanding of the meaning of periphery and peripherality: “Pe-
ripherality generally connotes distance, difference and dependency. A typical pe-
riphery is geographically remote, economically lagging, dependent upon external 
political and industrial decision-making, and culturally obsolete” (Eskelinen/Snick-
ars 1995: 1). Based on this defi nition, “peripheralisation” would be a process which 
results in a given region becoming more remote or less accessible, economically 
less viable and politically more dependent. One could even distinguish “active” and 
“passive” peripheralisation – the former caused by purposefully cutting transport 
links, closing businesses and limiting the political infl uence of (the inhabitants of) 
a specifi c region. “Passive peripheralisation” would on the other hand imply that 
the region in question falls behind because it cannot keep up with the development 
of the centre. The most important additions of peripheralisation as a theoretical 
concept can be summarised as follows: (1) Peripheralisation is relational: Peripher-
alisation implies processes of centralisation and vice versa (Lang 2015: 175). (2) Pe-
ripheralisation is a social process, not a geographical fact. Discourses and images 
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play an important role in this context (Balogh 2015; Bürk 2013). (3) Peripheralisation 
is dynamic and reversible. 
In the following four sections, we critically discuss the four dimensions of pe-
ripheralisation identifi ed by Bernt/Liebmann (2013): out-migration (demographic 
peripheralisation), dependence (being in a marginal position in superordinate net-
works), disconnection (infrastructural peripheralisation and being on the margins of 
information society) and stigmatisation (discursive peripheralisation). This list was 
developed in a research project analysing how middle-sized towns in Germany deal 
with processes of peripheralisation. Against this backdrop, the four characteristics 
and their weighting need to be reconsidered and expanded according to different 
research questions. We believe, for instance, that there are two additional aspects 
of peripheralisation – social peripheralisation (i.e. social exclusion) and political pe-
ripheralisation (i.e. a distancing of larger parts of the population from democracy, 
expressed for instance in low voter turnout and a high percentage of votes for ex-
tremist parties) which are strongly interwoven with, yet only implicitly covered by 
these four dimensions. Making social and political peripheralisation more explicit 
would also answer Lang’s (2015: 180) call to pay more attention to how “ordinary 
people” deal with the processes of peripheralisation. This call indicates that the 
local civil society currently takes an (undeserved) backseat in research on periph-
eralisation. 
Peripheralisation is a multilevel phenomenon that can affect whole regions, spe-
cifi c settlements, but also individuals. The former is especially true for the four “clas-
sical” aspects of peripheralisation, the latter for social and political peripheralisation 
processes as well as the strategies “ordinary” people develop to deal with the chal-
lenges of peripheralisation for their lives. There are, on the other hand, segments 
of peripheralised regions or societies that are less affected by peripheralisation, 
e.g. the municipalities where the services of general interest are centralised. This 
potential of peripheralisation as an overarching concept for multi-level research, 
especially the potential to link processes and developments at the macro level to 
their consequences at the micro level, should be strengthened in future empiri-
cal work and theoretical discussions. The fact that peripheralisation is a relational 
process, meaning that it is always connected to a process of centralisation, and a 
multidimensional process is in our opinion a major advantage vis-à-vis other con-
cepts: Since peripheralisation focuses on the interplay of multiple actors on various 
levels and can therefore lead to a better understanding of how people, communities 
or regions are pushed to the margins and their leeway to deal with or even resist 
becoming a periphery. The idea that peripheralisation is both reversible and a “con-
stitutive element of capitalism” (Fischer-Tahir/Naumann 2013: 10) allows for a more 
comprehensive perspective of the possible impact of adaptation strategies and best 
practices for regional development. The link of peripheralisation and adaptation is 
further elaborated in section 3.
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2.1 Out-migration
Out-migration is, according to Bernt/Liebmann (2013: 219-220), the primary indica-
tor of peripheralisation. Leaving can be interpreted as a voting “with one’s feet”. 
Out-migration is usually a selective process, i.e., some subgroups of the popula-
tion are more likely to leave than others, e.g., young women (Leibert 2016; Wiest/
Leibert 2013; Kühntopf/Stedtfeld 2012). Many rural adolescents have long before 
school assimilated that “all of the pathways to success that are understood to be 
strategic and/or successful are premised on pathways that lead [them] out of their 
rural homes and communities” (Looker/Naylor 2009: 54). This brain-drain of the 
young, highly qualifi ed, and well-educated people is an important barrier to “de-
peripheralisation” because it weakens the innovative potential of peripheries while 
inhibiting the development and implementation of new ideas and strategies (Bernt/
Liebmann 2013: 220; Kühn/Weck 2013: 31). 
Migration should, however, not be solely interpreted as a threat for rural regions. 
Out-migration is also a “pre-requisite for rural economic regeneration” (Stockdale 
2006) since the availability of appropriate “human capital” is a crucial aspect of 
endogenous regional development. Migration is usually a precondition to the ac-
quisition of the skills and knowledge necessary to participate in the economic re-
generation of rural regions, as institutions of higher education are mostly urban-
based. The problem lies therefore not in out-migration per se, but in the weakness 
of the reverse fl ow, meaning that too many out-migrants go for good. Migration is 
hence a double-edged sword for rural regions: Unlike the popular stereotype which 
contrasts the “stable countryside” with the “hypermobile city” (Milbourne/Kitchen 
2014), rural regions are intensely affected by mobility such as out-migration of the 
youth, in-migration of retirement migrants, “passing through” of tourists or long-
distance labour mobility of weekend commuters. They all do affect rural areas in 
similar ways. This ambiguity of mobility can be translated into a rural mobility para-
dox: “on the one hand, [rural places] require mobilities to remain sustainable […] 
while, on the other these same mobilities have the power to destroy the essence of 
the place” (Milbourne/Kitchen 2014: 335). Even sedentariness is not equivalent to 
stability and immobility. Mobility (e.g., in terms of commuting) is increasingly used 
as a means to gain stability and to be able to remain in rural regions with a degraded 
job market or in regions in which mobility and long distance travel for the purpose of 
basic needs satisfaction is compelled by the withdrawal of state and market institu-
tions (Walsh 2012: 137). An open question is how to deal with the consumption of 
rurality, notably counter-urbanisation, second homes and travel (both tourism and 
day trips) (see e.g. Halfacree 2012) i.e. temporary in-migration of people who value 
that “time stands still” and that the region in question is disconnected from modern 
life. Since the consumption of the countryside involves a repositioning of services 
and infrastructures to the needs of the inhabitants of the centres, this form of in-mi-
gration can also be considered as a manifestation of peripheralisation (i.e. another 
form of dependence), but one that helps to maintain a certain level of services of 
general interest in depopulating regions.
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2.2 Disconnection
Disconnection can be understood as a progressive disconnection of the peripher-
ies from regulatory systems like the state or the market based on decisions made 
in the centres of economic and political power (Kühn/Weck 2013: 33). This process 
is in the fi rst place related to not having or losing access to economic powerhouses 
and has two dimensions: disconnection from infrastructure and disconnection from 
economic and social innovation (Neu 2006). In economic terms, peripheries can be 
defi ned as areas characterised by a lack of local and/or regional innovative capaci-
ties, which translates e.g., into the absence of institutions of higher education, low 
qualifi cation of the workforce or low intensity of research and development activi-
ties of local enterprises (Kühn/Weck 2013: 33-34). Disconnection originates in the 
fi rst place from a non-dynamic knowledge economy sector and a disintegration of 
the link to advanced value-added processes (Bernt/Liebmann 2013: 220). 
In infrastructural terms, disconnection is related to a constrained access to the 
economic centres of gravity, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating spatial inequali-
ties (Naumann/Reichert-Schick 2015: 1). The existence of technical and social infra-
structures and the provision of services of general interest are crucial for regional 
development (Reichert-Schick 2013: 34); this applies particularly to transport infra-
structures. Demand for mobility increases given that adaptation strategies most 
frequently consist in a centralisation of services of general interest in middle-sized 
towns (“people to services”). The need for a well-developed road network is hardly 
questioned since dependence on private car transportation is a key feature of pe-
ripheral regions (Osti 2010: 306). The future of public transport in sparsely popu-
lated rural regions, on the other hand, is a topic that can easily fi ll volumes (see e.g., 
Canzler/Karl 2010; Holz-Rau et al. 2010; Steinrück/Küpper 2010). The abandonment 
of publicly funded transport in sparsely populated rural regions is not a taboo in this 
context (e.g., Canzler/Karl 2010). Apart from fi scal arguments, proponents of phasing 
out or radically remodelling the provision of services of general interest in rural pe-
ripheries argue that it is morally questionable whether the public (i.e., the tax-payers 
in the core regions) should subsidise the residential preferences of rural residents. 
According to this view, the implementation of a “user-pays” principle is proposed to 
cut infrastructure costs in the countryside (Holz-Rau et al. 2010: 493, 502). 
The disconnection from economic and social progress and from technical and 
social infrastructures lead to social exclusion of the more vulnerable segments of 
rural societies – which might indeed be added as an additional fi fth characteristic 
of peripheralisation, notably children, the elderly, the poor, the unemployed, people 
with no cars and those without effective support networks. Social exclusion has 
three core dimensions: (1) exclusion from economic life, (2) exclusion from social 
services, and (3) exclusion from civic life and social networks (Spoor 2013: 140-141). 
The most important driver of social exclusion is a constrained access to mobility 
on an individual level, which is the most important precondition for participation in 
social and professional life (Hauss et al. 2006: 35). Disconnection hence results in 
mobility restrictions for parts of the rural population. It seems that social exclusion 
is rather widespread in rural East Germany (Laschewski 2009: 105). This is, for in-
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stance, transcribed in very high levels of long-term and youth unemployment, child 
poverty and strong dependency on transfer payments.
2.3 Dependence
Unequal power relations between centres and peripheries are another key aspect 
of peripheralisation. The peripheries are dependent on decisions which are made in 
the centres and on which they have hardly any infl uence, e.g., with respect to loca-
tion decisions, investments or allocations of funds (Beetz et al. 2008: 305; Kühn/
Weck 2013: 41): “The relation of centre and periphery is less a spatial fact than a so-
cial confi guration resting on unequal power relations which lead to uneven spatial 
development. The political dimension is characterised by power in the centre and 
powerlessness at the periphery” (Kühn 2015: 375). The political and economic deci-
sion and control functions in Germany are mostly concentrated in the largest cities, 
notably Munich, Berlin, and Düsseldorf (Kühn/Weck 2013: 37). Smaller cities, includ-
ing some state capitals, are largely deprived of decision-making centres, especially 
due to the absence of major enterprise’s headquarters (Kühn/Weck 2013: 37). The 
economic polarisation fades somewhat if global market leaders – many of which 
are small and medium-sized businesses – are taken into account. About one fi fth 
of such “hidden champions” are located in municipalities that can be characterised 
as “peripheral” or “very peripheral”, especially in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. 
World market leaders are, on the other hand, notably absent in rural East Germany 
(Ermann et al. 2012). 
Dependence is also connected to the funding of local governments. Many rural 
municipalities only have limited freedom of action as a result of low fi scal revenues, 
high welfare expenses and debt servicing as well as fi nancial constraints caused by 
misguided investments in the past (Beetz et al. 2008: 300). The result is a perma-
nent dependence on transfer and equalisation payments as well as on budget ap-
propriations (Kühn/Weck 2013: 37), leading to a keen competition for state, federal 
and European funds. This translates into an alignment on grant requirements and 
the programme’s objectives. Hence, local governments are often unable to pursue 
consistent long-term development strategies based on specifi c local challenges and 
locally available resources. The changing philosophies, objectives, and rules of the 
subsidy programmes as well as the limited duration of funding periods and pilot 
projects do dictate a constant reorientation of local approaches. Regional develop-
ment policies turn into a “strategic management of dependencies” (Bernt/Liebmann 
2013: 226).
It would, however, be short-sighted to assume that peripheralised regions (and 
their inhabitants) are per se “victims of […] overarching processes beyond their 
control” (Lang 2015: 176). While Kühn/Weck (2013) are certainly right with respect 
to the limited (fi nancial) leeway of many rural municipalities, the agency of other 
stakeholders is often neglected in discussions about rural futures. Lang (2015: 180) 
argues that forms of agency can cover a spectrum ranging from reproducing the 
existing core-periphery relations to resistance. One notable (and fi nally successful) 
example of local resistance to decisions made in the centres is the “rebellion in the 
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classroom“ (Steffen 2013) which took place in the small town of Seifhennersdorf 
(Saxony). In answer to the decision to close the local secondary school, the parents 
took matters in their own hand – by breaking the law: The pupils refused to attend 
the school they were assigned to and instead attended classes in Seifhennersdorf, 
where retired teachers gave the lessons. The municipality has backed this civic dis-
obedience and contested the school closure in court. In the end, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court declared the Education Act of the Free State of Saxony on which 
the decision to close the school was based to be unconstitutional (Seibel 2014). 
Other examples for agency in the periphery are “Raumpioniere” (literally “spatial 
pioneers”) who develop on their own initiative innovative and tailor-made solutions 
in order to fi nd new ways to sustain services of general interest (Faber 2013) and so-
cial entrepreneurship which aims at solving the problems of declining rural periph-
eries with marketable products and services (Federwisch 2014: 100). One should, 
however, not overlook that peripheralisation is often connected to social exclusion 
(Leibert 2013: 105-109). Social exclusion, especially unemployment, is linked to a 
loss of regional human capital (Ebenrett et al. 2003). Since human capital seems to 
be an important precondition to become a “Raumpionier” or a social entrepreneur, 
the question remains open whether the history of peripheralisation, especially the 
degree of selective out-migration in the past, limits regional agency capacities. We 
will get back to this question in section 3.3.
2.4 Stigmatisation
Stigmatisation is the fourth dimension of peripheralisation. In contrast to Bernt/
Liebmann (2013: 219-220) who regard out-migration as the core indicator of periph-
eralisation, we believe that stigmatisation is the root cause of the consolidation of 
peripheralisation. The perception of a given region by its inhabitants and by external 
stakeholders (e.g., national politicians, potential investors) does infl uence location 
decisions of all sorts: Whether to leave or to stay, whether to (dis-)invest, whether 
to establish, maintain or abandon services of general interest. In discourses on rural 
peripheries it is sometimes claimed that the negative consequences of peripherali-
sation are results of a failure of local governments and civil societies.2 One example 
is the notion of “lost regions”, where “no innovators can be found that try to create 
a future” (Weber/Klingholz 2009: 3). Structural problems, on the other hand, are 
less frequently acknowledged; the responsibility for “arrested development” is al-
lotted to the peripheries themselves (Bernt/Liebmann 2013: 221): The ascription of 
the failure to enter a virtuous circle of successful regional development to regional 
politicians and ultimately to the regional population itself fosters a negative regional 
image. The unfavourable development trends become a characteristic of the whole 
place (Bernt/Liebmann 2013: 221). This is especially apparent in the media cover-
2 See e.g. Bürk’s (2013) analysis of the stigmatisation process of Sangerhausen (Saxony-Anhalt) 
and the “discursive violence infl icted on the city” (2013: 175). Bürk (2013: 180) interprets the 
(politically motivated and ideologically informed) stigmatisation of single places and regions as 
being about “’blaming the victim’ of new state spaces”.
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age of rural peripheries and other demographically and/or economically declining 
regions. In recent years, the national press has, for instance, repeatedly picked up 
on the depopulation and ageing process undergone by the East German country-
side linking demographic change with dramatising descriptions of moribund towns 
and villages hallmarked by poverty, hopelessness, and out-migration of the “best 
and brightest”. Headlines like “Empty East: only the footsore stay”, “Ocean of pov-
erty and dementia” or “drinking contests in the depression zone” (Speck/Schubarth 
2009: 15) contribute to paint a gloomy picture of rural East Germany. Stayers who 
are depicted as a “negative selection” of society are given particularly bad press. 
This is especially true for young men who are often portrayed as unemployed and 
uneducated boozers with right-wing world views (Rolfes/Mohring 2009: 77-78).
The demographisation of the discourse on rural infrastructures in the political 
and scientifi c spheres can be perceived as a form of stigmatisation and marginalisa-
tion that has especially far-reaching consequences. Regional policy is, as Lang (2015: 
176) points out, “always normative […] and framed by individual and collective val-
ues linked to specifi c understandings and conceptualisations of development, de-
sired policy outcomes and funding priorities”. Removing the rural population from 
the picture can lead to policy recommendations such as the – fi ercely criticised 
(Steffens/Kröhnert 2009: 219) – proposal of an “orderly retreat” (Klingholz 2015: 27) 
from the “lost regions” mentioned in the previous paragraph. Given the high costs 
of providing and maintaining social and technical infrastructures in rural areas, it is 
proposed that residents of “fading places” – small villages with an overaged popula-
tion in sparsely populated regions – should receive a bonus payment to encourage 
them to move to urban agglomerations or regional centres (Berlin-Institut 2007: 30; 
Steffens/Kröhnert 2009: 218): “The government of the Land should communicate in 
[“lost regions”] that an ongoing emptying-out is inevitable in the long run. Trying to 
prevent it would possibly be considerably more expensive than to allow it or even 
support it” (Steffens/Kröhnert 2009: 219). The stigmatisation and marginalisation 
is somewhat implicit: Rural regions are portrayed as places that have absolutely 
nothing worth preserving for future generations. This label is probably even more 
detrimental for the future of rural areas since the public tends to readily accept the 
reasoning that a specifi c service of general interest has legitimate reasons to be cut 
when labelled “too expensive”. Convincing voters that rural regions are a consider-
able burden for the budget and that the tax payers’ money would be better spent 
elsewhere (i.e., in the centres) is an especially powerful tool, helping to legitimise 
policies that result in infrastructure cutbacks. 
There is a risk that the inhabitants of demographically and economically declin-
ing rural regions themselves incorporate this perception. Feelings of being left be-
hind and forgotten, of living in a place that has had its days can affect regional iden-
tities and lead to senses of hopelessness, a “mental peripheralisation” (Kühn/Weck 
2013: 39) that blocks innovation and creates isolated milieus as well as increases 
apathy of the population (Reichert-Schick 2013: 37). Negative internal and external 
images can hence lead to mental lock-ins and paralyse whole regions, resulting in a 
downward spiral that is hard, but not impossible to break (Lang 2012: 1751). 
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In the next section, we present a short case study in order to shed more light on 
the interplay of the processes of peripheralisation discussed in sections 2.1 to 2.4, 
in particular the links between stigmatisation and out-migration.
2.5 A case study of peripheralisation: Saxony-Anhalt
Saxony-Anhalt is the German Land with the most unfavourable population devel-
opment. As such, it is chosen to exemplify peripheralisation “in action”. The de-
mographic situation is characterised by a severe ageing dynamic and pronounced 
depopulation; in particular, in the remote and sparsely populated rural regions 
(Leibert/Köppl 2015). In this context, strong age- and sex-selective out-migration 
has emerged to be the most important driver of both depopulation and ageing. 
Young women in their early 20s have been more likely to leave the rural areas than 
coeval men (Wiest/Leibert 2013: 459-460), leading to a pronounced “defi cit” of 
young women in many rural municipalities (Kühntopf/Stedtfeld 2012: 29-36; Leib-
ert 2016: 268). These trends contribute to a distorted age- and sex-structure of the 
population, eventually resulting in a lack of potential mothers and simultaneously 
weakening the overall reproductive potential (Leibert 2016). Figure 1 shows that out-
migration of young adults – the fi rst basic dimension of peripheralisation (section 
2.1) – is a comprehensive phenomenon in rural Saxony-Anhalt. Net migration gains 
are largely restricted to the regional centres, selected district seats (Kreisstädte) and 
medium-sized towns hosting institutions of higher education. The few rural munici-
palities exhibiting positive migration balances are in most cases those places with 
accommodation centres for asylum seekers (Leibert/Köppl 2015: 63).
In addition to demographic problems, Saxony-Anhalt is also burdened with so-
cio-economic problems such as unemployment and child poverty (Table 1) as well 
as structural economic weaknesses (e.g., a weak innovation potential of the regional 
economy or a low wage level), both resulting in low levels of tax revenues (Table 1). 
Low fi scal revenues, in turn, generate structures of dependence, namely unequal 
power relations and dependence on funds and investments coming from outside 
the region. 
It is likely that the stigmatisation of East Germany (section 2.4) and its inhabitants 
in the media, its bleak socio-economic outlook, perceptions of lacking career pros-
pects, and selective out-migration of young adults are factors that do exacerbate 
each other. Media reports usually interpret out-migration of young people, espe-
cially of young women, as a barometer of future prospects of a respective region. 
Besides, public opinion is heavily infl uenced by reports on right-wing extremism, 
alcoholism, poverty, devastation, and desperation, which again enforces the migra-
tion patterns of young people. The ones who stay within the region are branded as 
“the stupid remainders” (Speck/Schubarth 2009: 15). Youth are sensitive to media 
coverage when it comes to making major life decisions, and they, as a consequence, 
have little faith in the future sustainability of East Germany (Beetz 2009). These fi nd-
ings are supported by results of a survey conducted among pupils and by in-depth 
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Fig. 1: Migration balance of young adults in Saxony-Anhalt by municipalities 
2012/13
 
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Federal as wells as Regional Statistical 
Offi ces (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2015)
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Tab. 1: Selected indicators of peripheralisation: social exclusion
Saxony- Urban districts Rural districts Germany
Anhalt West East West East total
Social exclusion
Unemployment rate 11.5 6.4 11.2 4.5 10.2 6.8
Youth unemployment rate 10.2 5.4 10.8 4.0 9.2 5.9
Long term unemployed per 
100 unemployed persons 35.4 36.9 35.3 29.3 36.8 35.6
Underemployment* 16.5 8.6 15.6 6.2 13.8 9.3
Welfare recipients 
(“Hartz IV”) per 100 
inhabitants under 65 16.7 8.9 17.6 5.5 13.5 9.5
Child poverty rate 26.8 14.8 28.4 9.0 20.7 15.2
Dependence
Tax revenue per capita 2012 451¤ 828¤ 547¤ 668¤ 448¤ 728¤
Gross value added (GVA) 
2012 46.8 61.6 48.2 53.4 46.0 57.4
GVA – development 
2007-2012 5.7 8.6 11.6 13.1 8.8 9.6
R&D** personnel per 1,000 
persons employed 3.5 15.7 8.8 7.9 4.6 12.6
Personnel in skill-intensive 
enterprise-related services 
per 100 persons employed 6.0 12.5 12.0 6.6 4.8 10.7
Personnel in creative 
industries per 100 persons 
employed 2012 1.6 4.0 4.9 1.7 1.2 3.4
Personnel in skill- and 
research-intensive industries 
per 100 persons employed 
2012 6.1 12.0 5.9 11.9 7.0 10.9
Personnel in the FIRE*** 
economy per 100 persons 
employed 2012 22.2 24.6 25.9 17.9 19.2 23.2
Median income per capita 
2012 2,137¤ 3,038¤ 2,338¤ 2,719¤ 2,069¤ 2,754¤
* Proportion of the workforce employed on the subsidised labour market (e.g. job creation 
schemes, vocational re-training)
** Research and development
*** Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Source: BBSR 2015
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interviews with young women carried out in the context of the ESPON SEMIGRA3 
project (see Leibert/Wiest 2012 for details). A large majority of the surveyed pupils 
are deeply convinced that their home region has no future, and that moving away 
is a necessary precondition for a successful professional career. The survey results 
further indicate that young people view regional living and labour market conditions 
in rural Saxony-Anhalt as hopeless and very unappealing. An overwhelming major-
ity considers it diffi cult or nearly impossible to fi nd a job, earn a living, and be suc-
cessful in their rural home regions. The young people are not necessarily counting 
the days until they can fi nally leave, but they are not reluctant to move away either: 
Only a third of the interviewees agreed that it would be painful for them to move 
away from their native region (Wiest/Leibert 2013: 462). The reasoning behind this 
grudgingly accepted mobility is that remaining in the countryside and becoming 
successful are perceived as mutually exclusive options, as the following statement 
reveals: “I would very, very much like to leave the rural area in order to improve my 
occupational outlook and to promote my career” (male pupil, Harz district). Such 
aspirations are fostered by perceptions of hopelessness affl icting home regions, 
but also by the “lure of the center”, which is regarded as a place to settle down 
permanently, a place where a variety of well-paid jobs are available: “I think I’ll live 
[…] in Bavaria [in 10 years]. I’ve always been attracted by this region and rumor 
has it that there are better career opportunities. I’ll start a family there and build a 
house” (male pupil, Altmarkkreis Salzwedel). Young people tend to contrast oppor-
tunities available in rural regions with those offered in urban areas. The perception 
of a socio-economic disconnection of rural Saxony-Anhalt from economic centres, 
which translates into a feeling of spatial and social marginalisation, is a central topic 
within interviewees’ narratives (Wiest 2016: 285). This indicates that home region 
peripheralisation is not an abstract concept for young people growing up in the 
East German countryside, but a reality they happen to experience every day. The 
parents of the interviewed pupils share the perception that rural Saxony-Anhalt is 
a declining periphery that has nothing to offer for ambitious young people. Against 
this backdrop, many parents advise their offspring to leave, often years before they 
even graduate: “My daughter is eleven, an age at which you don’t really have to start 
planning for the future, but as her mother, I tell her she won’t stay here. She has to 
move away at some point, because she won’t be happy here. […] She’s eleven, so 
she really shouldn’t have to be thinking about these things yet, but as her mother, I 
tell her she won’t stay here.” (unemployed woman, Stendal district). The peripherali-
sation of rural Saxony-Anhalt has hence resulted in a “culture of migration” (Wiest/
Leibert 2013: 463-464; Leibert 2015: 38-39): Staying is equated with failure, while 
leaving is perceived as being a very promising road towards success.
3 The ESPON 2013 SEMIGRA (Selective Migration and Unbalanced Sex Ratio in Rural Regions) 
project (2010-2012) aimed at identifying the main reasons and consequences of age- and sex-
selective migration in rural regions of Finland, Germany, Hungary and Sweden.
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3 The 3R-model: Adaptation (strategies) in theory and practice
Peripheralisation can be understood as a “missing link” insofar as this concept 
stresses the interconnectedness of political, economic, demographic and ideational 
factors, which tend to be overlooked when questions of regional development are 
“demographised”. One of the most important lessons is that concepts of adapta-
tion to demographic change in rural regions have to consider all four dimensions 
of peripheralisation: out-migration, disconnection, dependence and stigmatisation. 
On the one hand, we hypothesise that neither infrastructural cutbacks nor place-
based strategies do fully acknowledge all the dimensions of peripheralisation yet. 
On the other hand, processes of out-migration, dependence, disconnection, and 
stigmatisation can severely limit a region’s ability to develop and implement adapta-
tion strategies in order to improve regional living conditions and enhance economic 
potentials. More precisely, peripheralisation processes do constrain the region’s 
operational leeway in matters of adaptation to demographic change. They do affect 
the region’s autonomy to act (e.g., in terms of competences and funds), their ability 
to act (e.g., in terms of developing innovative measure) and the amount of resources 
available to them to act (e.g., in terms of infrastructure, social and human capital). 
One should always keep in mind that different regions have their own contextual 
particularities, both in terms of problems to be tackled and resources available. In 
other words, instruments and measures that are successfully implemented in one 
region may not work at all in another. An additional link between peripheralisation 
and adaptation is the normative nature of regional policy (Lang 2015: 176) which 
is relevant for the design of adaptation strategies. Meaning the question in which 
regions strategies of Retrenchment and centralisation are pursued and in which 
regions a Repositioning and Reorganisation of the services of general interest is 
implemented. Before we discuss this 3R-modell in the public sector using examples 
from the fi eld of rural public transport (section 3.2) we fi rst briefl y turn to the current 
discussion on the paradigm of equal/equitable living condition in Germany (section 
3.1) and conclude with some refl ections on whether voluntarism is an ubiquitous 
locational factor – to borrow a term form industrial location theory (section 3.3).
3.1 Adaptation to what? – Objectives of action 
The constitutional obligation towards the creation of equitable living conditions in 
all parts of Germany is enshrined in article 72 (2) of the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. More specifi cally, the German federal planning law (Raum-
ordnungsgesetz) refers to living conditions as an aggregation of several dimensions 
including economic performance, the labour market, health care, material prosper-
ity, the housing market, the education system, culture, the technical infrastructure, 
mobility, and the environmental situation (BBSR 2011: 16). It does not mean that 
the same living conditions should be found everywhere (“equal”), but rather that a 
standard level of services of general interest should be met (“equitable”). In order 
to limit spatial disparities, the welfare state aims at providing a minimum level of 
services of general interests in all parts of Germany (Einig/Jonas 2009: 130). The 
•    Tim Leibert, Sophie Golinski
paradigm of equitable living conditions is limited to services of general interest, i.e. 
public services provided and/or supported by the federal, regional or local govern-
ments or their agencies (öffentliche Daseinsvorsorge), whereas private services are 
largely beyond the scope of governmental authority. Public services include both 
technical infrastructures (e.g., water supply, sewage disposal, energy supply, waste 
collection and treatment, public transport) and social infrastructures (e.g., educa-
tion, health care, culture, sports) (Kersten et al. 2015: 9). 
In 2006, new guiding principles regarding the spatial development of Germany 
(Leitbilder der Raumordnung) were enacted in order to achieve equitable living 
conditions while accepting a basic level of divergence among regions. One of the 
principles has been explicitly dedicated to secure the provision of essential public 
services and addresses the threat posed by demographic change and its conse-
quences (BBSR 2015). The continued adherence of law-makers to equitable living 
standards in Germany has cyclically provoked ideological disputes. Whereas sup-
porters justify equitable living standards by recalling the basic functions of a wel-
fare state, opponents condemn the paradigm in order to rule out compensational 
actions remedying the locational disadvantages of lagging regions (e.g., Canzler/
Knie 2009; Elbe/Müller 2015: 57; Klingholz 2015: 25). In general, the obligation of 
equitable living conditions in all parts of Germany remains one of most important 
objectives of the German spatial policy which provides orientation and determines 
adaptation strategies. In terms of the provision of public services and facilities in 
rural areas, current adaptation strategies seem to be providing a set of useful tools, 
but recent research also recognises that long-term, sustainable and comprehensive 
structures are still implemented insuffi ciently (e.g., Steinführer et al. 2014; Beetz et 
al. 2008).
3.2 Adaptation and peripheralisation: The 3R-model
Although numerous political discussions, maintenance efforts, and funding pro-
grammes have been conducted in response to demographic changes, current re-
search has focused little on the adaptation of public sector organisations (Boyne 
2004: 97). Several studies, related to organisation studies, have assigned concepts 
on organisational decline and turnaround of private organisations to the public sec-
tor. In other words, strategies of adaptation, which are pursued by private organi-
sations in order to increase their performances, are assumed transferrable to non-
profi t organisations. Primarily focused on the private sector, a substantial body of 
work on organisational turnarounds has investigated numerous activities operated 
by failing organisations. As a result, it has been found that organisational recov-
ery can be managed through three different adaptation strategies (3R-model) – re-
trenchment, reorganisation, and repositioning – (Walshe et al. 2004: 201; Boyne 
2004: 98). Retrenchment basically indicates the reduction in scope or size of an or-
ganisation, thus immediately scaling down fi nances and costs. Kersten et al. (2015: 
12) give a brief and simple description of what retrenchment means: “Less popula-
tion + less money = less infrastructure”. Reorganisation or replacement, instead, 
aims at changing the internal structure of an organisation. By replacing members 
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of the management, or beyond, internal changes are favoured over alterations in 
an organisation’s size or market position. Finally, repositioning or renewal results 
in changing the entrepreneurial strategy of an organisation. Longer-term actions 
involve fundamental shifts in vision, activities, and markets in response to changing 
external circumstances (Küpper 2011a: 89; Walshe et al. 2004: 204). Boyne trans-
ferred the existing theory on failure and turnaround from the private to the public 
sector. He acknowledged that public services of general interest are also confronted 
to fast-changing demands and, therefore, have to accordingly adapt their supply 
structures. Drawing lessons from the profi t-seeking sector, retrenchment suggest 
that non-profi t organisations withdraw from the market completely. This is, how-
ever, problematic as local authorities are usually obliged to provide certain services. 
Hence, retrenchment strategies are solely applicable if exit strategies are only par-
tial or the responsibilities are shifted to other, external organisations (Boyne 2004: 
100). Strategies of reorganisation in the public sector encompass broad changes in 
the organisation culture, such as the decentralisation of responsibilities or the inter-
nal implementation of new concepts of service provision in accordance with fl uctu-
ating customer expectations (Boyne 2004: 101). Repositioning is widely viewed as 
an innovative strategy, meaning that the quality of service provision is enhanced by 
new, innovative facilities and services (Boyne 2004: 100). Strategies are frequently 
combined: For example, the creation of entirely new services (repositioning) may 
also involve a structural reorganisation of the service provider. 
The 3R-model is increasingly used as a concept to analyse the process of ad-
aptation of public services in rural areas in response to demographic change (see 
e.g., Steinführer et al. 2014; Küpper 2011a). In order to cut-down operating costs, 
retrenchment has for instance been adopted in many cases in response to declining 
demand (Steinführer et al. 2014: 334). Whereas fi nancially-motivated retrenchment 
strategies generally consist of (partial) closing-downs, reorganisation and reposi-
tioning strategies refer to a conversion towards a more fl exible system in strong ac-
cordance to customer needs. However, it has to be mentioned that the 3R-strategy 
was originally developed to turnaround the performances of single organisations, 
whereas rural areas are confronted with comprehensive and manifold challenges 
concerning almost all public services and where piecemeal, sectoral adjustments 
will not ensure the success of future planning strategies. Moreover, if we do not 
consider peripheralisation as merely a decline in population (Beetz et al. 2008: 296), 
we also have to discuss adaptation strategies regarding selective out-migration, 
disconnection, dependence, and stigmatisation on top of a “simple” adaptation to 
shrinking demands. 
Retrenchment can be defi ned as the “R” that in almost all cases leads to (further) 
peripheralisation, both at the regional, the local and the individual level. Reduc-
ing, abandoning or centralising services of general interest is interlinked with all 
four characteristics of peripheralisation. The concept of a downward spiral in rural 
regions (Weber/Fischer 2010: 91, Fig. 2) triggered by a lack of jobs (disconnection) 
and selective migration (out-migration), ultimately leading to a loss of political clout 
and the emergence of a “no future” sentiment (stigmatisation) sheds light on the 
interlinkages and feedback loops of peripheralisation and infrastructural cutbacks. 
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The “dependence” aspect of peripheralisation is covered implicitly by the external 
decisions to reduce or close local infrastructures and the lacking assertiveness of 
the local population and local authorities to avert the implementation of aforemen-
tioned cuts. Repositioning and reorganisation might, however, be alternative strate-
gies that policies of de-peripheralisation could be based on, i.e. potential ways out 
of the vicious circle of depopulation, ageing and disinvestment. This is, however, 
a diffi cult process and a matter of small steps. One problem is that – due to the 
multilevel nature of peripheralisation – comprehensive deperipheralisation policies 
based on repositioning and reorganisation strategies have to operate at various 
levels in order to be successful. It is, however, likely that already partial deperipher-
alisation policies might improve the development prospects of a given region and 
the quality of life of its inhabitants.
Deperipheralisation policies approaching disconnection would include measures 
to re-connect the peripheralised regions by improving infrastructures and fostering 
economic and social innovation (see section 2.2). By pursuing this strategy one, 
however, faces the challenge to fi nd solutions that aim at more effi ciency, less sub-
sidies and better infrastructures as well as provision of services of general interest 
at the same time. Strengthening local self-government, increasing decision-making 
authorities as well as the fi nancial room to manoeuvre of districts and municipalities 
is a frequently suggested (see e.g. Kröhnert et al. 2011: 73) and promising strategy 
to reduce the dependence of rural regions on decisions made at the federal or the 
Fig. 2: Socio-demographic downward spiral
 
Source: Weber/Fischer (2010: 91)
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Länder level. This would, however, result in more or less far-reaching reforms of 
the structure of German federalism. Tackling the problem of stigmatisation is even 
more complex. Stigmatisation has two spheres like regional identity: the sphere of 
stereotypes – the outsider’s view – and the sphere of emotions – the insider’s view. 
The former is linked to the image of a region, while the latter refers to the regional 
consciousness of the local population, a feeling of togetherness that is reproduced 
via social networks, schools and the local media (Raagmaa 2015: 290-291). Chang-
ing the outsider’s view is an uphill struggle. The “dominant narratives, icons and 
images” used by the media tend to be ”remarkably persistent” (Bürk 2013: 175) not 
least because the stigmatised places serve as metaphors for larger regions (e.g. 
East Germany) or socio-demographic processes (e.g. deindustrialisation, depopula-
tion) (Bürk 2013).
In fi gure 3 we present possible strategies to improve the effi ciency and to main-
tain the economic sustainability of different forms of public transport and cab 
companies in peripheralised rural regions. The list is non-exhaustive and based on 
conceptual considerations rather than concrete examples. We believe that three 
aspects should be highlighted. First of all, it is not always possible to link a specifi c 
strategy unambiguously to one of the three “Rs”. Take for example the “replace-
ment strategy” of line operation by demand-responsive transport schemes. If the 
timetable and the stops served remain the same and the only thing changing is that 
customers have to notify the operating company in advance that they wish to take 
the bus (the “L-Bus”-model; see Steinrück/Küpper 2010: 40-41), one can also clas-
sify the service changes as retrenchment. If the timetable, the number and location 
of stops have been expanded as a result of the replacement of line services by a 
demand-responsive transit scheme according to the needs to the customers (the 
“R-Bus”-model, Steinrück/Küpper 2010), the service adaptation would rather be a 
repositioning. One could fi nally refer to a reorganisation if the regular bus service 
would be replaced by a door-to-door-service without a real timetable (the “F-Bus”-
model, Steinrück/Küpper 2010).
Secondly, the impact of adaptation is necessarily selective. While people that 
depend on a certain service of general interest will be immensely affected if the 
service in question is reduced, discontinued or made less accessible, non-users 
may hardly notice the changes. The former have to develop their own adaptation 
strategies, they may have to invest more time, money and creativity to hold their 
lives together. In most cases, the reduction or discontinuation of services of general 
interest have to be counterbalanced by increasing (auto-)mobility, e.g. if schools, 
hospitals or shops are centralised. Since the young, the socially deprived and the 
elderly tend to be less (auto-)mobile, they are disproportionately affected by re-
trenchment. Proponents of retrenchment strategies (e.g. Holz-Rauet et al. 2010 who 
promote the “user-pays-principle”) rarely pay attention to the social bias and the 
resulting danger of social exclusion for peripheralised social groups (see e.g. Hauss 
et al. 2006).
Thirdly, the “improvement” strategy should not be ruled out from the beginning. 
A recent representative survey carried out in Bavaria has shown that the percent-
age of people who use regional rail services on a regular basis has increased from 
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32 percent in 2005 to 50 percent of the total population in 2015. The number of 
regular train users has increased by 86 percent in municipalities with less than 5.000 
inhabitants – even though many of these rural communities are not served by pas-
senger trains. The reasons why Bavarians take the train have also changed: Com-
muting to work or school is no longer the dominant motive – people increasingly 
use public transport for leisure trips or to go shopping. However, the improvement 
strategy does not seem to work for all means of transport: Bus ridership continues 
to decline (Naumann 2016). In order to legitimise the maintenance of public services 
in rural regions, an extension of the consumer base may be a promising strategy, 
especially if the service in question is of supra-regional importance. The “demog-
raphisation” of the debate on the future of rural infrastructures tends to ignore the 
fact that certain infrastructures and services (e.g. railway lines) are not only used by 
the shrinking local population, but also by non-locals. In other words: Local solu-
tions (e.g. mobility vouchers, ride sharing) should only be pursued if the problem is 
basically local.
Finally, it has to be noted that demand-responsive transport schemes, which 
are frequently portrayed as the best solution for rural public transport (e.g. Heinze 
2007) do not necessarily result in lower costs for the taxpayer and better and more 
frequent services for the users. Solutions like call-a-bus possibly improve the cus-
tomer satisfaction and may lead to a higher demand, and thus meet the goal of 
providing a more customer- and demand-oriented rural public transport. However, 
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the revenue-to-cost-ratio of demand-responsive transport schemes is very low in 
sparsely populated rural regions – as is the number of customers per trip (Küp-
per 2011b: 161). In other words: Due to frequent empty trips, demand-responsive 
transport schemes in sparsely populated rural regions can cause higher pollution 
than motorised personal transport and hence have a negative overall environmental 
balance (Steinrück/Küpper 2010: 2). Replacing non-economical services of general 
interest provided by the public sector by alternative solutions based on active citi-
zenship and volunteerism is another “popular” theme in discussions and scientifi c 
policy advice that should be considered more critically, as will be shown in the next 
section.
3.3 Active citizenship – the silver bullet for rural regions?
In practice, advocating individual and innovative solutions, public participation and 
responsibility as a recipe for the successful adaptation of public services as well as 
of social and technical infrastructures collide with the harsh reality of declining and 
disconnected local human and social capital (Beetz et al. 2008: 300). Spatially se-
lective processes of population decline have eroded the potential of human capital 
over the past two decades (Plöger/Weck 2014). There is a shortage of active and 
dedicated actors in many municipalities, not only concerning civil society, but also 
regarding local administrations and enterprises (Bernt/Liebmann 2013: 230). The 
likelihood to mobilise societal stakeholders and networks and to make use of their 
potential determines the amount of social capital within a community. A decline 
in human capital hence corresponds to weaker cooperation, loss of mutual trust 
among local actors and lesser knowledge exchange (Wiesinger 2007: 54). The loss 
of both human and social capital have a quantitative as well as a qualitative dimen-
sion: Whereas the quantitative dimension is merely related to a shrinking popula-
tion, the qualitative dimension has to be framed as a complex outcome of peripher-
alisation and its dimensions: selective out-migration, dependence, disconnection, 
and stigmatisation. As a consequence, rural peripheries might increasingly lack im-
portant preconditions and capacities to cope with the challenges of demographic 
change (Nelle 2015: 3). However, up to today, only little is known on the impact of 
shrinking quantitative and qualitative human resources on endogenous develop-
ment practices in peripheral regions.
Other investigations discuss the possible function of human and social capital for 
civic engagement in terms of voluntarism in the provision of public services. They 
conclude that a sustainable and long-term provision of services of general interest 
based on voluntarism is questionable (Steinführer 2015: 15). The main reasons are: 
(1) active citizenship requires resources, notably human and social capital, which 
are not ubiquitous; (2) the number of possible volunteers will decrease in the future, 
especially in areas where they are most needed; and (3) even voluntary services 
and mutual help require a certain critical mass (Osti 2010: 303). This is especially 
true for Saxony-Anhalt where we can fi nd the lowest level of voluntarism in Ger-
many and one of the lowest ratios of contact points supporting civic engagement 
per capita (Generali/ISAB 2015: 14). Moreover, the already low number of potential 
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volunteers is expected to decrease by more than 20 percent until 2025 relative to 
the 2006 level. According to this projection, the highest losses are likely to occur in 
rural districts which are already characterised by an accumulation of demographic 
and socio-economic problems such as unemployment, out-migration, low tax rev-
enues, and structural economic problems (Swiaczny 2010: 207-208). Against this 
backdrop, Swiaczny (2010: 209) concludes that “those regions most in need of ad-
ditional volunteer services to compensate for declining public provisions seem to 
be those, which are probably least able to generate enough additional volunteers 
because of their limited demographic capacity”.
Both human and social capital are important prerequisites for place-based de-
velopment strategies. The basic problem is, however, that active citizenship is not a 
ubiquitous resource, the same applies to social capital which is necessary for self-
help. Depopulated and economically weak rural regions are often characterised by 
a lack of endogenous resources – both with respect to fi nancial and social capital 
– necessary to tackle the problems of economic and infrastructural restructuring 
and to compensate the retreat of the state (Beetz et al. 2008: 300; Raagmaa 2015: 
289). Processes of peripheralisation threaten the local stock of human and social 
capital, thus infl uencing the active involvement and ability to participate in regional 
development initiatives. Research assumes that a lack of human resources and so-
cial capital becomes obvious in volunteer services as compensations for declining 
public provisions. We additionally suggest to consider human resources (and their 
changes) for adaptation strategies under conditions of peripheralisation in general. 
A conceptualisation and implementation of comprehensive (adaptation) strategies 
with respect to sustainable regional development need a certain amount of intrinsic 
human resources. 
4 Conclusion and fi nal thoughts
Peripheralisation – i.e. the interconnectedness and interaction between out-migra-
tion, dependence, disconnection and stigmatisation – is a decisive, yet underesti-
mated factor to any (rural) region’s ability to maintain (or even enhance) an appropri-
ate level of services of general interest and of technical and social infrastructures. 
The forces of peripheralisation (inter)act in a spatially selective way, which means 
that the problem’s scope, methods of resolution and resources available are also re-
gion-specifi c. Shifting perspectives from one-size-fi ts-all solutions to locally-devel-
oped and context-specifi c adaptation strategies do ultimately imply that the most 
useful instruments for addressing the challenges of demographic change – self-help 
and active citizenship – not only depend on the local stakeholder’s will to tackle 
the ensuing problems, but also on the complex network of power relations and 
dependencies they are embedded in. Keeping that in mind, the peripheralisation 
approach is helpful as it is a means to better understand why differences matter and 
also because it offers insights on how rural development policies that avoid eroding 
potentials for endogenous regional development should be designed. The periph-
eralisation concept has, however, some weaknesses. They become apparent when 
Peripheralisation: The Missing Link in Dealing with Demographic Change?    • 
one tries to link the consequences of demographic change and the development 
of adaptation strategies. Peripheralisation is, after all, a concept employed in order 
to better understand regional disparities, but not a theory on which interventions 
could be based upon. This endeavour would require a better understanding of how 
rural societies work, of local institutional frameworks, of social structures and of 
stakeholder networks. The notions of dependence and disconnection are especially 
helpful in this context; both can also be used to analyse social relations at the micro 
level. One additional aspect – the “human factor” – is however needed to complete 
the picture. It is this “human factor” that matters with respect to the formation of 
such networks, which keeps them operating (or eventually breaks them up). 
Declining and peripheralised regions can become “laboratories of demographic 
change” in which alternative and innovative adaptation strategies are tested. New 
actors, e.g. “spatial pioneers” and social entrepreneurs can make an appearance 
because the problems are so pressing and the approaches at hand (by trend re-
trenchment strategies) appear to be part of the problem rather than the solution. 
Against this backdrop, local stakeholders may be willing to try something new and 
different, the superordinate authorities may be willing to issue special permits for 
ideas that might be unsuitable in other contexts. In such a lab-like situation, ideas 
can be put into practice which would otherwise fail due to bureaucratic regulations 
or the opposition of local stakeholders. Active citizenship and volunteerism are im-
portant preconditions for this kind of de-peripheralisation. Local populations are, 
however, only to a certain degree willing and able to take over responsibilities that 
are perceived as core tasks of the public authorities. This willingness as well as the 
human and social capital necessary to design, implement and perpetuate volun-
tary services are not ubiquitous resources. And neither are external stakeholders 
automatically willing to support civil society initiatives – and this support is often 
crucial in order to put innovative ideas into practice. A voluntary transport scheme 
may, for instance, encounter opposition from local cab companies, face legal prob-
lems related to the Public Transport Act or be abandoned by the local council if too 
large subsidies are required. The “human factor” may also be the reason why active 
citizenship does not work. There are often few key actors, which are involved in 
multiple citizens’ initiatives and serve as nodes for a given local society. But, what if 
two of these key actors become antagonists? Or if one of these pillars of society is 
no longer willing or able to keep up his/her voluntary work? The role of the “human 
factor” remains under-researched. It may be helpful in this respect to analyse failed 
attempts in order to better understand at what stage and for what reasons projects 
may collapse. 
The peripheralisation concept could inspire holistic policies of de-peripherali-
sation. Peripheralisation posits that peripheries are not determined by geographic 
location, but by social and economic processes. It is hence safe to assume that the 
peripheralisation of a given region is reversible, i.e., the region in question is not 
forever doomed to be a periphery. In other words: In contrast to the self-reinforcing 
and largely inevitable vicious circles and downward spirals that constitute the heart 
of the demographisation discourse, the peripheralisation approach implies that if 
peripheries are produced and reproduced via out-migration, dependence, discon-
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nection, and stigmatisation, de-peripheralisation still remains possible. This could 
be achieved by policies aimed at fostering or enabling in-migration, independence 
(or autonomy), integration, and improvement of the region’s external image. This is, 
however, a challenging enterprise. Given the relative lack of power of the peripher-
ies, it remains questionable if a political framework based on the idea of de-periph-
eralisation can be initiated in the peripheries themselves or if it has to be the result 
of decisions increasing territorial or social cohesion made in the centres. Such a 
framework should be built on repositioning and reorganisation strategies as well 
as an empowerment of local actors and stakeholders and include measures that 
give the municipalities more fi nancial and legal leeway to develop and implement 
tailor-made solutions – provided that such solutions do not jeopardise services and 
infrastructures of supra-regional importance and that they do not lead to a unco-
ordinated coexistence of isolated local solutions that would ultimately threaten the 
territorial cohesion of rural regions.
There is an abundance of promising suggestions to mitigate or even overcome 
the problems of dependence and disconnection, i.e., powerlessness and under-
funding at the local level. However, to infl uence out-migration and stigmatisation 
is diffi cult, if at all possible. We may have to accept that there are regions, which 
permanently depend on external support. The question whether the inhabitants of 
such regions should have access to a well-developed infrastructure, networks, and 
adequate levels of services of general interest ultimately is a political, not a demo-
graphic question. Weakly frequented rural bus services or other infrastructures may 
be expensive for the taxpayer, but not expensive enough to destabilise the federal, 
state or municipal budgets. The basic question is if the society as a whole is willing 
to permanently subsidise some parts of the country or, to put it differently, if the 
benefi ts of maintaining an attractive and viable countryside outweigh its costs. This 
long overdue societal debate is suppressed by the demographisation of the debate 
on the future of rural areas.
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